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EVOLUTION IN CHILD ABUSE LITIGATION:
THE THEORETICAL VOID WHERE
EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL
WORLDS COLLIDE
William Wesley Patton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rules of evidence focus primarily on the narrow issues contested
within the pleadings of a single case. A few exceptions address issues
beyond the pleadings such as privileged communications made outside
the courtroom, statements made during negotiations, and extra-judicial
actions taken by a party such as remedial repairs. These evidentiary
rules are based on broader social considerations, namely the protection of
certain confidential relationships, the encouragement of compromise and
settlement of disputes and the promotion of action that will further pub-
lic safety.'
This Essay suggests a need for evidentiary and procedural rules that
would permit or require judges to consider the entire systemic effect of
their evidentiary rulings. Such rules would address issues beyond the
pleadings in a single case on the basis of the polestar policies of accurate
and fair judicial determinations. The rapidly increasing number of civil
disputes or criminal charges which result in a host of separate trials in
different courts based upon the same factual scenarios calls for this type
of analysis.2 Such multiple litigation creates a complicated and dramatic
matrix of procedural and evidentiary dilemmas. This Essay proposes
* Professor, Whittier College School of Law; B.A., 1971, California State University,
Long Beach; M.A., 1974, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1977, University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles.
1. FED. R. EviD. 501 (incorporating common law regarding privileged communications);
see GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULE, LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORrrY § 501.3, at 153 (1987) (citing MCCORMICK ON EvI-
DENCE § 74.2, at 179 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)) (discussing policy underlying Rule
501); FED. R. EVID. 408 (precluding admissibility of evidence of compromise or offers to com-
promise to prove liability for or invalidity of claim); see also FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory
committee's note (discussing social policy of promoting settlement of disputes and resolving
conflicts). FED. R. EVID. 407 (precluding admissibility of evidence of remedial measures to
prove negligence or culpability); FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (discussing
social policy of encouraging remedial action).
2. For example, a trial court in a civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
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that current evidentiary theory fails to prevent a collision of the conflict-
ing evidentiary and procedural worlds arising from multiple proceedings.
The example of child abuse litigation allows an exploration of these
issues because it is one substantive area of the law where a single alleged
incident frequently gives rise to multiple judicial proceedings.' Child
abuse law is "quasi-civil, quasi-criminal" because it constantly changes
valences between criminal and civil litigation. In addition, it is still in its
evidentiary infancy, with rapidly evolving rules.4 In this complicated set-
ting, an evidentiary ruling in a civil juvenile dependency proceeding may
have consequences on several possible future adjudications resulting from
the same facts: a civil suit by the abused child against the alleged abuser
for damages; a criminal prosecution of the alleged abuser; a marriage
dissolution in family court; or a juvenile delinquency case involving
abuse by one child against another. 5
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (RICO), may make evidentiary rulings that
could have consequences for a parallel or subsequent criminal RICO trial.
For a discussion of the myriad state and federal statutes providing both criminal and civil
remedies for violations of environmental controls, see Richard H. Allan, Criminal Sanctions
Under Federal and State Environmental Statutes, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (1987).
"Insider trading" securities cases give rise to both civil and criminal charges and may be
litigated in both federal and state courts simultaneously. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988)
(providing private right of action for violations of securities regulations); id. § 78t-l(e) ("(A
private right of action] shall not be construed to bar or limit in any manner any action by the
Commission or the Attorney General under any other provision of this chapter, nor shall it bar
or limit in any manner any action to recover penalties, or to seek any other order regarding
penalties."); id. § 78u(d) (permitting Securities Commission to transmit evidence to Attorney
General to institute criminal proceedings). Not only may securities violations result in sepa-
rate federal civil and criminal trials based upon the same factual allegations, the state courts
may also permit civil and criminal actions. See, eg., Binder v. Southeastern Historic Restora-
tion, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 620, 623 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (declining pendent-party jurisdiction for
defendant having little to do with securities fraud claim).
3. Several different disputes frequently arise from child abuse allegations. William Wes-
ley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REv. 473, 475
(1990) [hereinafter Patton, Parallel Lines].
4. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
5. Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile Courts in Child Abuse
Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 201, 204 (1987) (discussing differences in ways juvenile
courts and family courts treat issues such as hearsay, children's testimony, discovery and pre-
sumptions).
For a detailed discussion of the evidentiary and constitutional problems created by multi-
ple trials based upon the same triggering events, see William Wesley Patton, Forever Torn
Asunder: Charting Evidentiary Parameters, the Right to Competent Counsel, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in California Child Dependency and Parental Severance Cases, 27
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1987) [hereinafter Patton, Forever Torn Asunder]; Patton, Paral-
lel Lines, supra note 3.
Child abuse tort actions are increasing because many jurisdictions now apply a delayed
discovery statute of limitations. See Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limita-
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First, this Essay looks at the importance of evidentiary rules in
bench trials. The strong presumptions of judicial capacity to disregard
prejudicial data and the corresponding appellate court deference to the
trial judges' discretion appear to diminish the importance of evidentiary
rules in non-jury trials. Second, assuming that the law is correct in
granting such deference to trial judges' evidentiary rulings, do eviden-
tiary decisions in bench trials have significant impact on additional litiga-
tion based upon the same facts? Third, if trial court rulings have such an
impact, can current evidentiary theory provide trial judges the power to
ameliorate the prejudicial impact of evidence in subsequent or parallel
proceedings? Finally, this Essay suggests that current evidentiary theory
fails to address these issues outside the scope of the discrete proceeding in
which an admissibility decision is made.
II. Is JUDICIAL INSULATION SUFFICIENTLY DEAFENING?
In child abuse litigation, a number of factors suggest the conclusion
that evidentiary rules have little or no impact on bench trials. First, the
rules of evidence have been substantially eviscerated, or at least dramati-
cally relaxed. Modifications of the general rules have made all relevant
evidence admissible, and double or triple hearsay statements are indi-
rectly admissible when attached to a probation report.6 Second, the im-
pact of this theory of broad admissibility is magnified by the presumption
tionsfor Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. Rav. 355 (1991) (advocating
use of delayed discovery statutes to give child abuse plaintiffs greater opportunity to bring tort
claims); Donna Wares, The Unleashing of Memory, CAL. LAW., July 1991, at 19, 19-20.
The number of courts in which sexual abuse allegations may be litigated could expand
dramatically if Congress passes the Violence Against Women Act of 1991 which was approved
by the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18, 1991. 137 CONG. RFC. D926 (daily ed. July 18,
1991). The Act was favorably reported to the Senate on October 29, 1991, 137 CONG. REc.
S15,400 (daily ed. October 29, 1991), and awaits action by the full Senate. That Act "would
make sexual assault a federal civil rights violation, enabling victims to sue their assailants for
civil damages under federal law." Maureen Balleza, Victims of Rape Increasingly Seek Justice
in Civil Lawsuits, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 23, 1991, § II, at 12.
6. Many laws governing juvenile court proceedings allow that "any matter or informa-
tion relevant and material to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring [the child]
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence."
E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992). The reason for expanding
the scope of admissible evidence in cases involving children is to give the judge "a coherent
picture of the child's situation." In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 426, 129 Cal. Rptr.
338, 350 (1976); see also Linda D. Elrod, Hearsay and Custody: The Twice Told Story, 21
FAM. L.Q. 169, 170 (1987) (statutes allow evidence for judges' consideration such as child's
and parents' custody wishes, child's interaction with parents, child's adjustment to home,
school and community).
See Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at 336-51 for a discussion of the admissi-
bility of evidence in probation reports prepared for dependency and parental severance trials.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1009
that judges can-and do-disregard inappropriate prejudicial data. In
child abuse dependency cases, it is almost impossible for a parent to re-
but that presumption. Parents do not have an absolute constitutional
right to counsel,7 and many who would need court-appointed counsel
often have no expert to argue their trial or appeal. 8
Some critics and courts have questioned the law's presumption that
judges conducting bench trials are able to disregard highly prejudicial
evidence.9 Other commentators argue that rules of evidence were tradi-
tionally promulgated to control juries, not judges, and therefore, the phi-
losophy of contemporary evidence law supports the admissibility of all
evidence in bench trials. 10
Even if one agrees that judges are better able than jurors to avoid
intellectual errors or to trace a chain of inferences, the presumption that
they can disregard inappropriate prejudicial data is overbroad. It as-
sumes that judges somehow are sufficiently more capable than jurors to
disregard emotionally prejudicial data." The United States Supreme
Court has not welcomed empirical psychological research when deciding
1
7. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
8. Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at 299-320.
9. See, eg., Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 74 IowA L. REv. 413, 445 (1989) ("A judge cannot keep prejudice to a fair minimum
without, in a rough and ready way, tabulating it."); Ted Kathleen Martin, Developing Dispo-
sition Decisionmaking Guidelines For Juvenile Courts 80 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Illinois at Chicago) ("Emotionalism rather than reason appears to prevail
[even in the] legal community charged with decision-making responsibilities for the alleged
child molester.").
"When one mentions the phrase 'child molester,' the common attitude is one of immedi-
ate horror and condemnation. Even the professional community responds by recoiling." Ar-
lyne Marjorie Diamond, The Child Molester and the Legal Process 11, 23 (1984) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pacific Graduate School of Psychology) ("[The emotional response to child
molestation is such that] dispassionate questions automatically asked in most other cases
where someone has been accused of a crime are not even considered."). But see Michael H.
Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency Formal Adversarial
Adjudication: A NewApproach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 353, 354 (rules of evidence designed for
juries, not judges).
10. Professor Rosenberg has identified five major reasons for giving trial judges broad dis-
cretion: (1) economize judicial resources; (2) maintain morale among judges; (3) ensure final-
ity; (4) avoid impracticability of formulating precise rules; and (5) recognize superiority of the
trial judge's ability to consider more factors than appellate courts. Maurice Rosenberg, Judi-
cial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 660-63
(1971).
11. See Commonwealth v. Dumas, 445 A.2d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Common-
wealth v. Conti, 345 A.2d 238, 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); A. Leo Levin & Harold K. Cohen,
The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 909 (1971).
In United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 470 (2d Cir. 1972), the federal
court found that even the state appellate court judges had been unable to disregard the prejudi-
cial effect of evidence heard by the trial court. Due process required that the case be remanded
1012
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evidence and trial procedure cases.'" The Court continues "to approve
legal rules based upon intuitive assumptions about human behavior that
research by psychologists has shown to be erroneous." 3 Given this ap-
proach, the presumption of judicial capacity to disregard prejudicial data
most likely will remain vital.
Even if one accepts the conclusion that judges can and do disregard
prejudicial evidence in routine civil cases, and perhaps even in criminal
cases, strong reasons exist for rejecting that presumption in child abuse
cases. First, in the context of child abuse litigation, the issues are partic-
ularly laden with emotion. One commentator has stated: "For the aver-
age adult, few subjects evoke stronger emotions than children,
victimization, and sex. Put the three together to form child sexual abuse,
and the stage is set for emotional pyrotechnics."' 4 Even psychological
professionals have "an almost universal negative reaction and indeed, re-
vulsion towards the child molester."'
5
Second, the less well-defined legal standards in child abuse cases
promote normative decision-making strongly influenced by individual
judges' attitudes, beliefs and values.' 6 Abuse cases require judges to
make subjective, ad hoe decisions with virtually no legislative guidance.'"
The ultimate standards used to determine "the best interests of the
child," whether a child is "undisciplined" or "in need of services," or
whether parents are capable of rearing their child "in a proper manner"
are overbroad, imprecise and subject to the individual normative predi-
lections of the judge.' 8 Many commentators have warned that such
for new trial because the state appellate court could not have been insulated from the improp-
erly admitted evidence. Id.
12. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L. Rnv. 137, 138-39 (1990).
13. Id.
14. John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater Objectivity,
88 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1709 (1990).
15. Diamond, supra note 9, at 6.
16. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 642-43.
17. Id.
18. See, eg., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02.2(c) (Anderson 1990) (defining "unruly
child" as one "[w]ho so deports himself as to injure or endanger the health or morals of him-
self or others"); Lennon v. State, 396 P.2d 290 (Kan. 1964) (affirming child dependency deter-
mination based on statutory criteria that minor was "without proper care" and mother
revealed "lack of moral fiber").
Almost all attacks upon dependency statutes alleging constitutional vagueness have failed.
See, eg., McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578 (W.D. Va. 1973); In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633,
115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1974); In re D.L.H., 253 N.W.2d 283 (Neb. 1977).
One commentator has noted:
[The] term "the best interests of the child" is a rather nebulous and ill-defined stan-
dard that opens a plethora of considerations. There have been many attempts by
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seemingly unreviewable, unbridled discretion coupled with the presump-
tion that judges will somehow disregard prejudicial data leads to arbi-
trary, aberrant and unjust results.' 9 Ironically child abuse law gives
judges even more discretion than in other areas to consider evidence de-
termined to be marginally relevant or highly prejudicial, such as raw
arrest data.
20
Third, the highly normative judicial decision-making in child abuse
litigation is exacerbated perhaps to an even greater degree by the cultural
biases of trial judges.21 Juvenile court judges come from a very narrow
segment of society; over ninety percent are white, married males with an
average age of about fifty-three years. 22 The class and cultural biases of
judges are compounded by those of other decision-makers in the child
dependency system such as law enforcement officials and social work-
ers.23 Because most juvenile court judges lack training in sociology and
psychology, they rely heavily upon the decisions of social workers.24
courts, not only in California but in other jurisdictions, to attach to that standard
some definitive, concrete, and objective terms. Those efforts have failed, for the most
part, differing even from case to case. There is still no concrete or definitive standard
to which a judge can look when the court must consider the best interests of the
child.
Christian Reichal Van Deusen, The Best Interests of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L. REV.
417, 419-20 (1991).
19. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. Rav. 691, 713
(1991); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Re-
tarded Patient, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 1201, 1203, 1216-17, 1231 (1990); Rosenberg, supra note
10, at 642; Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, The Exercise of Discretion in the Juvenile
Justice System, Juv. & FAM. Cr. J., Feb.-Mar. 1981, at 31, 31-33.
20. For instance, in In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976),
the court determined that it was not error for the trial court to have considered an "arrest
make-sheet" attached to a probation report because the report was admissible pursuant to
statute and because the judge stated that "he would not consider the arrests, as distinct from
convictions, as of any evidentiary value." Id. at 426, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
One commentator has shown that a judge's attitude affects evidentiary links and infer-
ences and that "some judges may consider evidence of a defendant's juvenile criminal record
logically probative of the fact that she is either a victim of circumstance or a born criminal."
Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 59, 95 (1984).
21. Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. RaV. 933, 943-44 (1991). Professor Delgado points out that
normativity "hides the person of the judge, who can reason that the decision was compelled by
some principle outside himself or herself.... Normativity arises out of our experiences, not
the other way around." Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1011 (1991) (discussing susceptibility of beliefs to change by
persuasion).
22. Kenneth Cruce Smith, A Profile of Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, Juv.
JUsT., Aug. 1974, at 27, 29.
23. See Thomas & Fitch, supra note 19, at 31.
24. Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children: A Search for
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Many studies have noted the various class and cultural biases of social
workers.25 Thus, a judge's normative bias is compounded by similar bi-
ases among social workers.
Fourth, the standard of appellate review in child dependency trials
and the non-reviewability of the effect of bias insulate judicial error from
reversal.26 The presumption of judicial ability to ignore prejudicial evi-
dence is bolstered by the standard of appellate review. Reversal requires
not only that the parent demonstrate that the judge relied on improper
prejudicial information, but also that the error was either harmful or cre-
ated a miscarriage of justice.27 However, the effect of bias is not subject
to appellate review, since it remains absent from the appellate record.2
Furthermore, such appellate review would require a careful analysis of
the entire trial record, and, as a result of the backlog crisis in the appel-
late caseload, such in-depth review has become highly unlikely. As a
result, courts of appeal will tend to have much less time to determine the
actual impact of prejudicial data on a trial court's decision.29 Finally,
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1017 n.168 (1975); cf CHRISTOPHER WOLFE,
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? 92 (1991) (dis-
cussing pros and cons of judicial activism in light of judges' abilities or disabilities to resolve
issues). The "inexperienced and incompetent" social workers who rely upon fundamentally
flawed empirical instruments when reaching custody decisions exacerbate the problem ofjudi-
cial bias. Michael S. Wald & Maria Woolverton, Risk Assessment: The Emperor's New
Clothes?, 69 CHILD WELFARE 483, 484, 503 (1990).
25. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977); JEFFREY M. SHA-
MAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 42 (1990); WOLFE, supra note 24, at 92; Lo-
renzo A. Arrendondo et al., To Make a Good Decision... Law and Experience Alone Are Not
Enough, 27 JUDGES' J. 23, 24-25 (1988); Hayman, supra note 19, at 1228; Coramae Richey
Mann, Courtroom Observations of Extra-Legal Factors in the Juvenile Court Dispositions of
Runaway Boys: A Field Study, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Nov. 1980, at 1, 43; Wald, supra note 24,
at 1001; Wald & Woolverton, supra note 24, at 484, 503.
26. For a discussion of the impact of the standard of appellate review, see William Wesley
Patton, It Matters Not What Is But What Might Have Been: The Standard of Appellate Review
for Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency and Parental Severance Trials, 12 WHITTIER L.
REv. 537 (1991) [hereinafter Patton, It Matters Not]. On the non-reviewability of bias, see
Hayman, supra note 19, at 1261 (asserting that responsibilities given to decision-makers in
juvenile process is sufficiently fragmented so that they are shielded from moral accountability).
27. Perry v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 734 F.2d 1441, 1446 (1 lth Cir. 1984); People
v. Saddler, 24 Cal. 3d 671, 684, 597 P.2d 130, 136-37, 156 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878 (1979); Brokopp
v. Ford Motor Co., 71 Cal. App. 3d 841, 854, 139 Cal. Rptr. 888, 895 (1977). For a discussion
of judicial error due to bias and the standard of appellate review, see Patton, It Matters Not,
supra note 26, at 541-49.
28. See supra note 26.
29. Patricia M. Wald, Difficult Choices: Coping With a Surging Caseload in the Court of
Appeals, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (reprinted in 114 F.R.D. 419, 545, 576, 582 (1986))
(backlog of cases may lead to decline in quality of appellate decisions); see also Gilbert S.
Merritt, Judges on Judging: The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of Appeals, 51
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since appellate delay may increase the likelihood of psychological bond-
ing between children and court-appointed foster parents or prospective
adoptive parents, natural parents may not regain custody even if revers-
ible error is found.
III. IS THE WHOLE SYSTEM LESS JUST THAN THE SUM OF ITS
INDIVIDUAL EVIDENTIARY PARTS?
Assuming that the relaxation of evidentiary rules, the presumption
of judicial competence and the appellate deference to trial court rulings
substantially minimize the role of evidence rules in child abuse bench
trials, the analysis does not stop here. The system's failure to consider
the cumulative effect of the myriad evidentiary and procedural changes
may be even more problematic. These changes may appear reasonable
and fair when analyzed individually, but when cumulated they create a
Kafkaesque nightmare.
Several examples point out the potential for inequitable results.
First, if parents do not answer depositions, they may suffer admissions
and waiver of cross-examination or rebuttal. If they answer, however,
the prosecutor in the criminal case gets discovery. Second, parents must
rebut presumptions of abuse, even though they often do not have an at-
torney and may lack the ability to do so on their own.3 0 Third, parents'
ability to inquire into the psychological state of the alleged victim is
much more limited than in ordinary civil cases, even though the ultimate
issue concerns the child's best interest which in turn may involve ques-
tions of the child's psychological health.3 Fourth, the traditional rules
for cross-examination have been substantially altered so that the accuser
will in all probability not be present in court during the examination.32
Fifth, multiple hearsay, evidence of prior bad acts and character evidence
normally inadmissible in ordinary civil or criminal trials are all admissi-
ble in dependency proceedings.33 Sixth, if the court orders the parents to
cooperate in family reunification therapy, the parents' statements are dis-
coverable by the criminal prosecutor.34
Our Symposium question-does evidence law matter?-cannot be
OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1990) (discussing decline in quality of appellate decision-making
as result of decisions made without oral argument or publication of written opinions).
30. Patton, Parallel Lines, supra note 3, at 478 n.20, 480-81.
31. Id. at 512 (parents may be prohibited from cross-examining adverse witnesses).
32. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1991) (allowing testimony by closed circuit
television); see also Patton, Parallel Lines, supra note 3, at 474 n.2 (many states have proce-
dural protections for child victim/witnesses in child abuse prosecutions).
33. Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at 337-38, 343-44.
34. Patton, Parallel Lines, supra note 3, at 483.
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answered by focusing on evidentiary rules alone, but must consider those
rules in their entire procedural context. For example, it seems rational to
create sanctions for failing to answer pretrial depositions in ordinary civil
cases because doing so may result in admissions or a waiver of the right
to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses on that issue. In contrast,
if parents answer pretrial questions in civil child abuse cases, their an-
swers are discoverable by the prosecution in a concurrent or subsequent
criminal case.
35
Procedural discovery rules in child abuse cases cannot be over-
looked when considering the impact of evidentiary rules. For example,
in a criminal proceeding, the prosecutor's ability to discover evidence
admitted in a related civil child abuse case dramatically increases the
stakes of evidentiary presumptions against the parents in civil litigation.
When the prosecution presents sufficient evidence that the child's injury
would not have been sustained except as a result of intentional abuse or
neglect, it establishes the prima facie evidence needed to support the
court's jurisdiction over the minor.36 The rationale for this presumption
is based on the need for facts which are more likely in the control of one
party, similar to the theory of res ipsa loquitur.37 But in a civil child
abuse case the evidence often involves technical medical data, and given
that the parents do not have a constitutional right to trial counsel,'3 it is
substantially more unfair to shift the burden of proof in this context.3 9
Moreover, because parents may lose their fundamental right to associate
with their child,' the stakes are much higher than in an ordinary civil
case where the presumption may appear less onerous.
The burden of this presumption of abuse or neglect becomes more
apparent given its consequences in collateral actions. "[I]f the parents
35. See id. at 478-79 for a detailed analysis of the procedural and evidentiary problems
created by multiple court hearings on child abuse charges.
36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (requiring such findings
be based on competent professional evidence); Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at
204.
37. Under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, a rebuttable presumption of the defendant's
negligence arises where the plaintiff presents proof that the instrumentality causing injury was
under the defendant's exclusive control and the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in the absence of negligence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39. For a discussion of the implications of shifting burdens of proof, see Ronald J. Allen,
Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REv. 843, 863 (1981); Charles R.
Nesson, Rationality, Presumptions, and Judicial Comment: A Response to Professor Allen, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1585 (1981); Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at 303-14.
40. Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (recognizing right of association
among members of extended family); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (discussing
interest of parent in companionship, care, custody and management of children).
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testify to rebut that presumption, in most jurisdictions the criminal pros-
ecutor has a right to the transcripts and may use them either as substan-
tive or impeachment evidence in the criminal trial. ' 41 Thus, the parents
are placed in an intolerable position: if they attempt to rebut the pre-
sumption, they help the criminal prosecutor; if they do not testify, they
are likely to lose custody of their child.
Another example of this cumulative effect involves the elastic notion
of hearsay in child abuse cases. Again, it appears that the need to con-
sider a child's testimony regarding alleged abuse may require a modifica-
tion of ordinary hearsay rules. Liberal theories of witness unavailability,
spontaneous declarations and statements against interest will substan-
tially increase the chances that a child's statements will be admitted in
the dependency case.42 But when these expansive admissibility rules
combine with other evidentiary and procedural rules-the admission of
multiple hearsay statements in probation or social worker reports; the
parents' lack of a right to counsel; and the requirement that the parents,
rather than the proponent, have the duty to subpoena hearsay witnesses
for cross-examination-the cumulative effect of these rules is to make it
impossible for parents to test the hearsay statements.43
41. Patton, Parallel Lines, supra note 3, at 481 n.26, 484.
42. Some states have assured that many more child witnesses will be permitted to testify
by substantially lowering or eliminating witness competency requirements. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE §§ 15-25-31 to -37 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-410 (Supp. 1990); People v.
Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219, 224 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding seven-year-old child competent
to testify).
For cases detailing the liberalization of hearsay rules in child abuse cases, see In re Me-
linda S., 51 Cal. 3d 368, 795 P.2d 1244, 272 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990); Smith v. State, 405 S.E.2d
78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Roman, 590 A.2d 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991);
Villalon v. State, 805 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048
(Utah 1991); In re Dependency of Penelope B., 709 P.2d 1185 (Wash. 1985); In re the Depen-
dency of S.S., 814 P.2d 204 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). But see Commonwealth v. Dion, 568
N.E.2d 1172 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding fifteen-year-old "special needs" student not com-
petent to testify to rape); Lambert v. State, 574 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1990) (holding school nurse's
testimony regarding statement of thirteen-year-old rape victim violated hearsay rule).
One commentator has noted that judges "operating without a jury ... tend to be more
liberal in allowing nonexpert and hearsay testimony in an attempt to hear all probative evi-
dence." Elrod, supra note 6, at 170.
43. See In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d 368, 375-85, 795 P.2d 1244, 1246-53, 272 Cal. Rptr.
787, 790-97 (1990) (allowing hearsay statements in social worker reports because reports in-
fused with elements of trustworthiness and objectivity); People v. Manuel M., 228 Cal. App.
3d 187, 196-99, 278 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857-59 (1991) (relying on expansive interpretation of wit-
ness unavailability in order to admit hearsay statements as declarations against social interest),
depublished by Cal. Sup. Ct., No. S020386 (May 22, 1991).
The California court has put a limit on the admissibility of hearsay. In People v.
Gandara, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1163, 284 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1991), the court held that although
Proposition 115 permits the introduction of hearsay in preliminary hearings, it does not permit
the introduction of multiple hearsay. Id. at 1172-74, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 911-13.
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In addition to these changes, the parents' ability to test the hearsay
statements has also been altered by a series of cases modifying the proce-
dures for cross-examining children.' The Supreme Court has sanc-
tioned procedures that permit a child witness to testify in a room
separate from the defendant, judge and jury. As a result, defense coun-
sel's ability to control evasive or argumentative child witnesses is sub-
stantially more difficult. Other common cross-examination trial tactics
designed to pressure a witness to tell the truth, such as forcing the wit-
ness to testify before prospective impeachment or character witnesses,
cannot be used if the child testifies out of court. Further, if defense coun-
sel is in another room cross-examining the child witness, counsel cannot
effectively address the jurors and cannot effectively use body language or
facial expressions to subtly influence jurors' perceptions of the witness's
credibility.4" Further, if counsel uses demonstrative or real evidence dur-
ing cross-examination, their subtle effects would be considerably dimin-
ished when viewed by jurors over closed circuit television.
Compare this series of separately rational evidentiary and proce-
dural rulings to individual body parts waiting to be transplanted. Inde-
pendently each appears normal, but when combined they create a
horrible Frankensteinian creature. The resulting body of law does not at
all resemble anything remotely similar to traditional notions of fairness.46
The myriad changes in the evidentiary and procedural rules that
apply in dependency proceedings have reached the point where a single
evidentiary ruling, fair and just in theoretical isolation, results in overall
unfairness, sacrifices factual accuracy and leads to unwise decisions that
often needlessly strip children of their family bonds forever. These re-
sults raise the serious question of whether judges can or should consider
the cumulative effect of evidentiary and procedural rulings on the overall
44. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 (1990) (holding child's testimony by closed
circuit television consonant with Confrontation Clause); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139,
3150 (1990) (suggesting corroborating evidence to support hearsay statement's trustworthiness
not allowed); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (noting Confrontation Clause provides
defendant protections of both physical confrontation of accusers and opportunity for cross-
examination).
45. See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 221-22 (2d ed.
1988) (noting importance of counsel's use of voice inflection to make impact on jury). During
cross-examination the jurors are judging the reactions, not only of the witness, but also of
defense counsel, the judge and spectators. The cross-examining counsel's attitude and the
jury's perception of that attitude are critical. "On cross-examination, [counsel] should be the
center of attention .... Let the jury know your attitude about the facts. . . ." Id. at 221.
46. See generally Patton, Parallel Lines, supra note 3, at 496-523, and Patton, Forever
Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at 321-51 for a discussion of the unfairness of waiver of privilege
against self-incrimination in child abuse cases.
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fairness of a hearing. Do judges have discretion to cure unfairness that
falls short of a due process violation?
IV. Do CURRENT EVIDENTIARY THEORIES PROVIDE
APPROPRIATE SOLUTIONS?
The previous section analyzed the dilemmas faced by parents in civil
child abuse cases where individual evidentiary rulings appear fair until
viewed as a functional whole. The cumulative evidentiary effect under-
mines the overall fairness of that discrete proceeding. In addition, bench
trial rulings may substantially prejudice a parent's rights and trial strat-
egy in subsequent or parallel litigation in different courts based upon the
same alleged abuse. This section addresses the question of whether cur-
rent rules of evidence permit trial judges to consider prejudicial effects
outside the pleadings to determine the fairness of evidentiary rulings.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and most state evidence codes argua-
bly include sufficiently general language to provide judges with discretion
to administer and rule so that the "proceedings [are] justly determined"
4 7
and "promot[e] justice."4 Judges also have a general power to exclude
evidence which presents a danger of unfair or undue prejudice4 9 or which
may cause a witness "harassment or undue embarrassment."5 But noth-
ing in these evidentiary rules indicates that their drafters considered the
problem of how evidentiary rulings in one case may substantially preju-
dice the rights of parties in other judicial proceedings arising from the
same facts.
Inter-system questions, such as the effect of civil child abuse rulings
on a subsequent criminal abuse case, require consideration of evidentiary
theory in its entire procedural and substantive context. The current
mode of analysis does not address these questions. The following exam-
ples demonstrate the need for such a comprehensive approach.
In the first example, a father is charged with sexually abusing his
daughter in a civil dependency case. Pursuant to an ordinary discovery
device,51 the father moves for a court-ordered psychological examination
47. FED. R. EVID. 102.
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 2 (West 1966).
49. FED. R. EVID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). The dual role of Federal
Rule 403 is to promote correct factual determinations "in individual cases and actual and
perceived fairness in the judicial process as a whole." United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d
611, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evi-
dence, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 220, 226-30 (1976)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
50. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) (establishing that when party's mental or physical condition is in
controversy, court may order physical or mental examination of party); CAL. CIV. PROC.
[Vol. 25:10091020
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of his daughter. The state's attorney argues that permitting the psycho-
logical test will violate the express prohibition against such examinations
in criminal trials, and that the state intends to prosecute the father crimi-
nally based upon the same alleged child abuse incident."2 Can the trial
court in the civil case refer to the criminal policies in deciding whether to
grant the civil psychological examination? Can the civil dependency
judge rule that the limited probative value in the civil case is substantially
outweighed by the prejudicial impact in the criminal case or that the
probative value is outweighed by broader social concerns, such as dis-
couraging abuse victims from seeking protection and redress or from tes-
tifying against the accused in the criminal case? 3
CODE § 2032(a) (West Supp. 1991) (allowing discovery by mental or physical examination
where mental or physical condition is in controversy). The physical and mental condition of
allegedly abused or neglected children is usually at issue in the civil dependency hearing not
only to determine whether or not the alleged abuse occurred, but also to determine threshhold
questions of the court's jurisdiction as well as the best interests of the child at the disposition
hearing. See, eg., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West Supp. 1992) ("The minor is
suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional dam-
age, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior
toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent ...."); id. § 361.5(3) (West
Supp.) (providing that parental rights shall be terminated if child "is removed a second time
due to physical/sexual abuse"); id. § 366.22(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing for parental sev-
erance if "return of the child after eighteen months of out-of-home placement would create a
"substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the minor."); see also
FRANCIS B. MCCARTHY & JAMES G. CARR, JUVENILE LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 235-36
(1989) ("Coercive state intervention should be authorized when a child is suffering serious
emotional damage .... ) (citing Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
of the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1976)).
52. Under the California Penal Code "the trial court shall not order any prosecuting wit-
ness, complaining witness, or any other witness, or victim in any sexual assault prosecution to
submit to a psychiatric or psychological examination for the purpose of assessing his or her
credibility." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1112 (West 1985).
53. In In re Dolly A., 177 Cal. App. 3d 195, 202-03, 222 Cal. Rptr. 741, 745 (1986), the
court avoided the problem by classifying civil child dependency trials as analogous to criminal
cases and held that the criminal statute prohibited the psychological examination. Id.
However, dozens of statutes and cases have clearly held that other criminal evidentiary
and legal rules do not apply to dependency actions because they are civil in nature and do not
seek to punish parents. See, eg., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1992)
("The purpose of this chapter [Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Law] is to provide for the
protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
and to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible. . . ."); id. § 203
(West 1984) ("An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be
deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be
deemed a criminal proceeding."); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding
that minimum constitutionally required burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence since
dependency cases do not implicate criminal punishment); Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that Due Process Clause does not require automatic ap-
pointment of counsel for parents because parental severance trials cannot result in criminal
sentences).
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The second example involves the admissibility of pretrial statements
made during negotiation in an alleged case of child abuse. Assume again
that the civil child dependency trial precedes the criminal child abuse
prosecution. During the negotiation or settlement conference, the par-
ents admit the abuse in exchange for a plea agreement with the state
attorney to return custody of their child and set up parenting classes to
help the family cure their problems. If the child brings a civil tort action
for damages, it is clear that the negotiation statements would be inadmis-
sible regarding liability.54 But in some jurisdictions the parents' negotia-
tion statements made in a civil dependency proceeding are admissible, for
instance, in the civil disposition hearing"5 or in a criminal sentencing
hearing.5 6 Does the civil dependency judge have jurisdiction to rule that
any parental negotiation statements are inadmissible in subsequent cases
in different courts? If not, it is unlikely that the best interests of the child
will be protected because the parents will be forced to remain silent until
the completion of any criminal prosecution, thereby substantially delay-
ing family reunification. Does the civil dependency judge have the dis-
cretion to exercise other protective measures such as sealing the parents'
statements so that the criminal prosecutor will not have access?57 Can
54. FED. R. EVID. 408 ("Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is likewise not admissible."); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1992)
("[C]onduct or statements made in negotiation... [are] inadmissible to prove.., liability for
the loss or damage or any part of it.").
55. The civil disposition hearing determines the placement of a child after the court has
sustained a child abuse petition. Patton, Parallel Lines, supra note 3, at 483.
56. Julius Libow, The Attorney's Role During Pretrial Procedures in Juvenile Dependency
Court, 100 L.A. DAILY J. REP., Aug. 7, 1987, at 9, 12. Mr. Libow is a dependency court
mediator for the Los Angeles County Juvenile Dependency Court. His article details the dan-
gers parents face from the use of pre-dependency trial statements and statements made during
civil dependency plea negotiations.
If the [child abuse or neglect] case does not settle and testimony is taken, the client
[parent] can be placed in greater jeopardy. The prosecuting attorney [in the criminal
case] has access to juvenile transcripts and may attempt to use a parent's testimony
in Juvenile Court for impeachment purposes in criminal court. It also provides more
discovery for the prosecuting attorney... The Youth Rights and Dependency
Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar is currently working on legislative reme-
dies to affirmatively state that Dependency Court jurisdiction taken on a plea of nolo
contendere or a submission on documentary evidence not be admissible as evidence
in any criminal proceeding.
Id.; see also Patton, Forever Torn Asunder, supra note 5, at 322-23 (arguing parents' state-
ments and offers to negotiate should not be admissible during jurisdictional hearings to deter-
mine whether allegations of child abuse or neglect are true).
57. Under the California Welfare and Institutions Code, the district attorney may partici-
pate in child dependency hearings at the request of the juvenile court judge. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 318.5 (West Supp. 1992). It is debatable whether the dependency trial judge can
limit the criminal prosecutor's access to dependency data. See Patton, Parallel Lines, supra
note 3, at 504-06 for a discussion of separation of powers and the court's ability to limit
prosecutorial discretion. It is clear that more prosecutors are seeking discovery of dependency
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the trial court issue a gag order to the state attorney not to disclose the
parents' statements to the criminal prosecutor?58 Again, the sequence of
cases dramatically affects the scope of evidence and substantially com-
promises the opportunity to realize the goals of conflicting evidentiary
policies among the different substantive areas.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the number of fact patterns triggering multiple hearings in dif-
ferent courts is increasing, we must begin to develop new procedures and
evidentiary theories to assure cumulative accuracy and fairness in all pro-
ceedings. The question of this Symposium-does evidence law mat-
ter?-must be answered with a decided "yes." Even if we discount the
role of evidence rules in bench trials because of liberal admissibility theo-
ries, the presumption of judicial capacity and appellate court deference,
evidence law still must play a vital role because a court's rulings can
dramatically affect the strategy and results of subsequent jury trials based
upon the identical facts.
statements and that the percentage of civil child dependency cases which are also criminally
investigated has been increasing dramatically during the past decade. In Los Angeles County
there was a 238% increase from 1980 to 1984. From 1987 to 1989 the various Los Angeles
prosecutorial agencies realized additional increases between 6% and 41%. Patton, It Matters
Not, supra note 26, at 539 n.7.
58. Whether the court can issue a legal and sufficient gag order between government attor-
neys is an open question. See, eg., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 604 (1976)
(suggesting court would have power to control release of information by officers of court). But
see In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating attorneys free to alert public and
press of discovered documents). Courts have disagreed whether erecting a "Chinese Wall"
between individual prosecutors in different branch offices, instead of disqualifying the entire
prosecutor's office, is a required remedy when protected facts have been disclosed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Borello, 624 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (requiring neither "Chi-
nese Wall" nor disqualification where prosecution affirmatively proves independent source of
facts at issue); People v. Wyatt, 530 N.Y.S.2d 460,461-62 (Crim. Ct. 1988) (holding disqualifi-
cation of district attorney's office proper where erection of "Chinese Wall" not acceptable);
State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357, 360-61 (Wash. 1988) (holding prosecuting attorney disqualified
where defendant had sought attorney's counsel on matters related to offense); cf. Glenn S.
Kaplan, Chinese Walls: A New Approach, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 63, 64-68 (1990) (discussing
attorney representation of adverse interests and finding that courts take flexible approach to
disqualification of law firms representing adverse interests where risk of harm is low).
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